Economics 454 — Assignment 2
经济学代写 This assignment can be done, either with one or two other students; you can also do it by yourself. It is up to you to find someone to work with.
This assignment can be done, either with one or two other students; you can also do it by yourself. It is up to you to find someone to work with. You can only be a member of one group. All group members will receive the same grade, so please talk about all answers. Please make sure that you both put in an equal amount of eflort: don’t put someone’s name on your assignment if s/he did not contribute sußciently to the group eflort. The due date of this assignment is March 26 in class. Assume that the equilibrium concept is Nash, wherever relevant. Fixed costs are zero unless otherwise specified.
1.Consider a market of homogeneous products in which firms compete on quantity.
Demand in this market is givenby
q(p) = 72 − 6p. (1)
There are both an incumbent firm M and a potential entrant E which can both produce the good at marginal costs 6. Prior to entry, E must incur an entry cost equal to Ce ≥ 0.
(a)Supposethat Ce = ∞. What are the equilibrium price, quantity for each firm, and profit for each firm?经济学代写
(b)Supposethat Ce = 0. What are the equilibrium price, quantity for each firm, and profit for each firm?
(c)Whatis the maximum value of Ce for which E does not make a loss if it enters?
(d)What is the maximum value of Cefor which it is optimal from a welfare perspective (i.e. total surplus) for E to enter? (At the maximum value it is also optimal for E not to )
2.Suppose that there are an incumbent M and a potential entrant E,经济学代写
each capable of producing a homogeneous good. To produce the good takes capital at a cost of 24 per produced unit of output and labor at a cost of 6 per unit of output. Demand is 36 − p. The game consists of threestages:
stage 1: M chooses how many units Km of capital to build at a cost of 24 per unit.
stage 2: E chooses whether or not to enter. If E enters then it incurs a cost equal to Ce ≥ 0.经济学代写
stage 3: If E did not enter then M is a monopolist and chooses how many units qm to produce. If E did enter then E and M choose simultaneously and independently how many units to produce (qe, qm respectively). In either case, E and M have to build suflcient capacity to meet production.
Example 1 Suppose that M chooses to build Km = 10 units in stage 1, E enters, and E,M each produce 25 units in stage 3. Then M pays 10×24 = 240 in stage one and must build an additional 15 units in stage 3 for which it must pay 15 × 24 = 360. M must further pay 6 × 25 = 150 for labor. Since the equilibrium price is 90 − 25 − 25 = 40,
M’s profit is 40 × 25 − 240 − 360 − 150 = 250. Now E. E must pay Ce to enter plus 25 × (6 + 24) = 750 in
costs. Its profit is then 40 × 25 − 750 = 250.经济学代写
Ignore the numbers in the example from here on.
(a)Supposethat E decided to stay How much profit would M make?
(b)Suppose that M chooses Kmto be less than or equal to the Cournot equilibrium value of qm and E enters. Determine the equilibrium profits of E,M.
(c)What would be the largest value of Cefor which E would not lose money if it entered?经济学代写
(d)Suppose that M chooses Kmto be equal to the Stackelberg equilibrium value of qm and E enters. Determine the equilibrium profits of E,M.
(e)Whatwould be the largest value of Ce for which E would not lose money if it entered in this case?
(f)Nowsuppose that M chooses Km so large that it will not be using all of it in stage 3 and E Determine the equilibrium profits of E,M.
(g)Whatwould be the largest value of Ce for which E would not lose money if it entered in this case?
(h)Draw four graphs to the same scale, one each for the cases Ce= 100, 200, 300, 500. In each graph, draw πe, πm as a function of Km assuming M,E make optimal choices in stages 2 and 3: use red for πe and blue for πm. Please be precise: don’t just sketch. This question will take some time and will yield a lot of points.
(i)Please comment on what is happening and why in each
3.Suppose that there is a single producer of a good and a single retailer.经济学代写
The producer’s marginal cost is 14 and the retailer’s marginal cost is the wholesale price w plus a unit retail cost equal to 4. The producer choosesthe wholesale price and the retailer the retail The demand function is 26 − p.
(a)Writedown the retailer’s profit function as a function of the retail price p and the wholesale price w.
(b)Whatis the optimal retail price choice as a function of the wholesale price?
(c)What is the correspondingquantity?
(d)What is the producer’s profit as a function ofw?
(e)What are hence the equilibrium values of w, p,q?
(f)What are the equilibrium producer and retailer profits (both separate and inaggregate)?
(g)Nowsuppose that the producer and retailer merge without a change in retail or production Then what would be the new equilibrium price, quantity, and profit?
(h)Providea brief intuitive explanation for why the retail price is now less but profits are
(i)If the producer and retailer are still separate firms, then how much of a $1 increase in the unit producer costgets passed through to the retailer and how much to the consumer?
(j)Howwould a $1 increase in the unit retail cost aGect the wholesale and retail prices? Please 经济学代写
(k)Now suppose that the producer oGers to sell its products to the retailer at the producer’s marginal cost (w = 14) in return for a fixed fee R. So the retailer pays the producer 14 per unit plus R. What would be the equilibrium retail price in thisexample?
(l)Whatwould be the profit of the producer and that of the retailer? Express the profit in terms of
(m)Showthat R should be between 8 and 12 (both inclusive) for both producer and retailer to be ok with this
(n)Whatis the relevance of the nonlinear pricing example for mergers?
4.Suppose that there is a nut manufacturer and a bolt manufacturer.经济学代写
Consumers need one of each. The cost of producing a nut is 10and the cost of producing a bolt is 4. Demand is
q(pn, pb) = 26 − pn − pb. (2)
(a)What are the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits? Equilibrium prices will not be the same
(b)What would be the corresponding numbers if the firms merged? You only need to set one combined price for a nut–bolt
(c)Explainwhy the price of a nut–bolt pair went down yet profits went
5.Considera market for diGerentiated products with two Each producer is tied to a single retailer.
Each producer first sets a wholesale price. Then, the retailer chooses a retail price. The demand functions are
q1(p1, p2) = 488 − 4p1 + 2p2,
q2(p1, p2) = 488 + 2p1 − 4p2.经济学代写
The production cost of each unit of either good is 28. There are no retail costs and no fixed costs.
(a)For given wholesale prices w1, w2, derive the optimal retail prices p1, p2as a function of w1, w2.
(b)Express q1, q2as a function of w1, w2
(c)Express the producers’ profit functions in terms ofw1, w2.
(d)What are the optimal wholesaleprices?
(e)What are the optimal retail prices? (f) What are quantitiessold?
(f)What are retailer profits perfirm?经济学代写
(g)What are producer profits perfirm?
(h)What would have been per firm profits absent a retailchannel?
(i)What is the range of franchise fee amounts that would make both the producer and the retailer better oG with a retailchannel?
- Whichthree ongoing merger cases would you like to be discussed in class and why?
济学454-作业2 经济学代写
可以与一名或两名其他学生一起完成这项作业。您也可以自己做。是否要找人工作取决于您。您只能是一个组的成员。所有小组成员将获得相同的成绩，因此请谈谈所有答案。请确保两个人都加入了相同数量的小花：如果他/她没有为小组的小花做出足够的贡献，请不要在某人的名字上注明他/她的名字。这项作业的截止日期是课堂上的3月26日。假设平衡概念在任何相关的地方都是纳什。除非另有说明，否则固定成本为零。
1.考虑一个同质产品市场，企业在数量上竞争。这个市场的需求由
q（p）= 72-6p。 （1）
有既有的企业M和潜在的进入者E都可以以边际成本6生产商品。在进入之前，E必须产生等于Ce≥0的进入成本。
（a）假设Ce =∞。每个公司的均衡价格，数量和每个公司的利润是多少？
（b）假设Ce =0。均衡价格，每个公司的数量和每个公司的利润是多少？
（c）E进入时不会亏损的Ce的最大值是多少？
（d）从福利的角度来看，最佳的Ce的最大值（即总盈余）是多少？ （在最大值处，E最好也不要输入。）
2.假设有一个既有的M和一个潜在的进入者E，每个都能够产生同质商品。生产商品需要资本，成本为每生产的单位产出24美元，而劳动力则为成本，每单位产出6美元。需求为36 − p。游戏包括三个阶段：
阶段1：M选择以每单位24的成本建造多少单位Km的资本。
阶段2：E选择是否输入。如果输入E，则将产生等于Ce≥0的成本。
阶段3：如果E没有进入，则M是垄断者，并选择要生产多少个qm单位。如果输入了E，则E和M同时且独立地选择要生产多少个单位（分别为qe，qm）。无论哪种情况，E和M都必须具备足够的能力来满足生产。经济学代写
示例1假设M在第1阶段选择建造Km = 10个单位，E进入，并且E，M在第3阶段各自生产25个单位。然后M在第1阶段支付10×24 = 240，并且必须在第1阶段建造另外的15个单位第三阶段，它必须支付15×24 =360。M必须进一步支付6×25 = 150的人工费。由于均衡价格为90 − 25 − 25 = 40，
M的利润为40×25 − 240 − 360 − 150 =250。现在E. E必须支付Ce才能进入，加上25×（6 + 24）= 750
费用。则其利润为40×25 − 750 = 250。
从这里开始，忽略示例中的数字。
（a）假设E决定不参加。 M会赚多少利润？
（b）假设M选择Km小于或等于qm的古诺平衡值，并且E进入。确定E，M的均衡利润。
（c）如果Ce进入，E不会赔钱的最大Ce值是多少？
（d）假设M选择Km等于qm的Stackelberg平衡值，并且E进入。确定E，M的均衡利润。
（e）在这种情况下，E不会赔钱的Ce的最大价值是多少？
（f）现在假设M选择的Km太大，以致在第3阶段它将不再使用所有Km，而E进入。
确定E，M的均衡利润。
（g）在这种情况下，E不会赔钱的Ce的最大值是多少？
（h）绘制四张相同比例的图，在Ce = 100、200、300、500的情况下各绘制一张。在每张图中，假定M，E在第2阶段和第2阶段做出最佳选择，则绘制πe，πm作为Km的函数。 3：对πe使用红色，对πm使用蓝色。请准确：不要只是素描。这个问题将花费一些时间，并且会提出很多要点。
（i）请在每个图表中评论发生了什么以及为什么。经济学代写
3.假设有一个商品的单一生产者和一个零售商。生产者的边际成本为14，零售商的边际成本为批发价格w加上等于4的单位零售成本。生产者选择批发价格，零售商选择零售价格。需求函数为26 − p。
（a）根据零售价格p和批发价格w写下零售商的利润函数。
（b）最佳零售价格选择与批发价格之间的函数关系是什么？
（c）相应数量是多少？
（d）作为w的函数，生产者的利润是多少？
（e）因此，w，p，q的平衡值是多少？
（f）生产者和零售商的均衡利润是什么（分别和总计）？
（g）现在假定生产者和零售商合并而零售或生产成本不变。那么新的均衡价格，数量和利润将是什么？
（h）提供简短直观的解释，说明为什么零售价现在更低而利润更高。
（i）如果生产者和零售商仍然是单独的公司，则t每增加1美元，有多少增加
生产者单位成本会转嫁给零售商，而消费者会转嫁给他们多少呢？经济学代写
（j）单位零售成本每增加1美元会如何影响批发和零售价格？请解释。
（k）现在，假定生产者以固定费用R的形式，以生产者的边际成本（w = 14）向零售商出售产品，那么零售商向生产者支付每单位14加上R的费用。在这个例子中均衡零售价格？
（l）生产者和零售商的利润是什么？用R表示利润。
（m）证明R和R应该在8到12（包括两端）之间，以使生产商和零售商都能接受这种安排。
（n）非线性定价示例与合并有什么关系？
4.假设有一个螺母制造商和一个螺栓制造商。消费者需要其中之一。生产螺母的成本是10，生产螺栓的成本是4。需求是
q（pn，pb）= 26-pn-pb。 （2）
（a）均衡价格，数量和利润是多少？此处的均衡价格将不同。
（b）如果公司合并，对应的数字是多少？您只需要为一个螺母螺栓对设定一个组合价格。
（c）解释为什么螺母螺母对的价格下降而利润却上升了。
5.考虑有两个生产者的差异化产品市场。每个生产商都绑定到一个零售商。每个生产者首先确定批发价。然后，零售商选择零售价。需求函数是
q1（p1，p2）= 488 − 4p1 + 2p2，
q2（p1，p2）= 488 + 2p1-4p2。经济学代写
每种商品的每单位生产成本为28。没有零售成本，也没有固定成本。
（a）对于给定的批发价格w1，w2，推导最佳零售价格p1，p2作为w1，w2的函数。
（b）将q1，q2表示为w1，w2的函数
（c）用w1，w2表示生产者的利润函数。
（d）最佳批发价格是多少？
（e）最佳零售价格是多少？
（f）售出的数量是多少？
（g）每家公司的零售商利润是多少？
（h）每家公司的生产者利润是多少？
（i）如果没有零售渠道，每家公司的利润将是多少？
（j）可以使生产者和零售商通过零售渠道获得更好的经营费用的特许费范围是多少？
6.您想在课堂上讨论哪三个正在进行的合并案例，为什么？
其他代写：algorithm代写 analysis代写 app代写 assembly代写 assignment代写 C++代写 code代写 course代写 dataset代写 java代写 web代写 编程代写 考试助攻 program代写 cs作业代写 source code代写 finance代写 data代写
